










































/ 


















































. 




































































































































































































































































































































































The Mystery of the Maine 


AN EXAMINATION OF 

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 

RELATING TO THE 

DESTRUCTION OF THE U. S. S. MAINE 

BY 

ROBERT H. BEGGS 

it 

UNIVERSITY PARK 
COLORADO 


& 


1912 

THE CARNAHAN PRESS 
WASHINGTON, D. C, 

°TT 









E’Yzt 

■ . 1 * .5 


COPYRIGHT, 1912 
BY 

R. H. BEGGS 

Gifr 

Aub’.'iOr 


IPj - ' ■> . 

fCT S 1313 











PREFACE 


S INCE the wish is so often father to the thought one must, 
to a greater or less extent, be held responsible for his 
opinions. In the following pages I maintain, contrary to 
popular belief, that the U. S. S. Maine was destroyed by her 
magazines, and that my friends may know the genesis of my 
heterodoxy and excuse it, this prefatory note is written. 

At the time of the destruction of the Maine our relations 
with Spain were so strained that no one could doubt that 
war would follow if proof were found of an external ex¬ 
plosion. Under such circumstances those who greatly depre¬ 
cated war were anxious that no evidence of a mine should 
be discovered. For my own part, I was sadly disappointed 
when our special commission reported that the condition 
of the wreck proved that the chief damage to the ship was 
from without. My disappointment naturally led me to look 
for 1 a weak place in the report, and this weak place I seemed 
to find when I noted that effects attributed to the first ex¬ 
plosion necessarily followed those attributed to a second. 
This part of the report reminded me of the burglar who 
secured entrance to a residence by going into the owner’s bed¬ 
room and stealing a latch-key with which he at once let him¬ 
self into the house! I urged this objection to the report in 
conversations with a few war hawk friends—one a college 
president—but to little purpose. This was a question for 
experts, and experts of high standing had investigated and 
decided. This summary disposition of my criticism “put me 
on my mettle” and I looked for other vulnerable places in 
the report. Finding these, I took advantage of my first 
leisure—a vacation spent at Ocean Grove, N. J.—to prepare 
a somewhat lengthy newspaper article on the subject, which 
article, through the kind offices of the late Prof. Charles 
Eliot Norton of Harvard, was published, with favorable 


y' 


3 


4 


editorial comment, in the Boston Transcript s ome time -m 
November, i898r- ^ m ember 9 7- I-th i n k. Later, I revised this 
article, adding extracts from government reports in support 
of my statements. This I did intending to publish in pamphlet 
form, but the work had served as a vent to my feelings, 
interest in the question at issue had subsided and I abandoned 
the idea of printing what few of my friends would care to 
read. 

But new interest has been awakened. The wreck has 
been examined by another board of naval experts. This 
board has reported and finds that the injuries to the ship, on 
which the first board based its theory of a submarine mine, 
were the results of an internal explosion. My chief conten¬ 
tion is thus sustained and I again decide to republish in the 
form of a booklet. I have said that the second report vindi¬ 
cates my criticism of the first. The second finds proof of a 
mine, to be sure, but the place assigned it is from 40 to 52 
feet from that assigned in the first report, and the proofs 
have nothing to do with those first set forth. 

The new evidence of this new mine does not seem adequate, 63 
but even if it were absolutely conclusive the second report 
negatives the first. The damage ascribed to a mine was not 
the work of a mine. The report on which we rushed to 
war was without foundation. Let us hope that when we 
again find ourselves about to draw the sword to avenge an 
alleged insult or injury we may “remember the Maine” and 
pause before we unleash the dogs of war. 

R. H. B. 

Washington, D. C., January 12, 1912. 




THE MYSTERY OF THE MAINE 


Since the destruction of the Maine in Havana Har¬ 
bor, February 15, 1898, startling events have followed 
in such quick succession that the terrible disaster al¬ 
ready belongs to a past whose remoteness is obscured 
rather than revealed by Time’s undiscriminating rec¬ 
ord. Because of this fact, because, measured by events, 
that fatal and fateful catastrophe already belongs to 
a distant past and because a reversal of the verdict 
as to its cause could in nowise affect our relations 
with Spain, it is now possible to canvass the attendant 
circumstances with the calmness necessary to the de¬ 
termination of facts, and with a judgment unbiased by 
any consideration of the results that might follow the 
conclusions reached. 

It is true, however, that the time will never come 
when either an American or a Spaniard can approach 
the question entirely free from bias, and, other things 
being equal, this bias will vary directly as one’s na¬ 
tional pride and inversely as the intelligence of the in¬ 
vestigator. Whether the dominant element in one’s 
patriotism be hatred of other nations, pride in his 
country’s ability to appeal from right to might, or 
jealous regard for her reputation for securing the 
wellbeing of all classes of her citizens and dealing 
honorably with other powers, whatever the type of 


6 


his patriotism may be, it will tend to incapacitate him 
for dealing in a judicial spirit with a problem so closely 
related' to the honor of his country’s flag. But while, 
under such circumstances, love of country must im¬ 
pair one’s judgment, it need not wholly paralyze it, 
and it is possible that a patriotic American or a patri¬ 
otic Spaniard may now reach a conclusion adverse to 
his country’s claim. Still, the evidence in such case 
must be far stronger than would be required to con¬ 
vince an indifferent investigator. 

That personal feelings profoundly affect the judicial 
faculty is recognized bv every court that maintains 
even the semblance of justice, for nowhere will a 
juror be accepted, no matter how honest, intelligent 
and honorable he may be, if he is prejudiced for or 
against either litigant; nor will any self-respecting 
judge preside in a case in which his own feelings are 
directly involved. 

Recent history furnishes striking examples of the 
fatal effects of partisan feelings upon the judicial 
faculty. In 1865 the 22nd Joint Rule was adopted 
by the two Houses of Congress, and for 11 years was 
eagerly championed by Republicans as a wise and judi¬ 
cious regulation, but bitterly denounced by Democrats 
as an unconstitutional and iniquitous measure. But 
in 1876 it became apparent that under the operation 
of this rule the Democratic claimant would secure the 
presidency; when all at once each party discovered 
that it had been wrong and the other right in its esti- 


7 


mate of the measure, and the Republican Senate 
promptly rescinded its former action and thus abro¬ 
gated the rule. 

The 15 distinguished jurists and statesmen who com¬ 
posed the historic Electoral Commission were men 
of great legal acumen and of unquestioned honor and 
integrity; but in each of the 19 decisive ballots taken, 
involving a variety of legal points and questions of 
fact, the 7 Democrats voted uniformly that both the 
law and the evidence sustained the contention of their 
candidate, while the 8 Republicans as persistently voted 
that both substantiated the claims of their own aspir¬ 
ant to the presidency. Each of the 285 votes was con¬ 
scientiously cast in favor of the party to which the 
voter belonged, yet it is certain that at least 133 of 
these, and possibly 152, were cast in error, and it is 
not improbable that at some time during these 19 
8 to 7 ballots each of the 15 members cast a vote un¬ 
consciously determined by his party affiliations. But 
this is not all. Congress passed upon the findings of 
the court in the case of each of the four states in con¬ 
troversy, and in every instance each congressman and 
senator found his judgment to be in harmony with his 
party’s interests. To question that party feelings in 
these cases inhibited the judicial faculty, is to charge 
that our most eminent and most trusted statesmen were 
unscrupulously dishonest in this emergency, and un- 
blushingly perjured themselves to secure their party’s 
supremacy—a proposition as repugnant to reason as 
it is to National honor and optimistic patriotism. 


8 


That the common people, like their party leaders, 
are influenced in their opinions upon a given subject 
by its bearing upon questions in which they have an 
interest, is strikingly illustrated by the vicissitudes 
through which the doctrine of “State Rights” passed 
before its settlement by an appeal from ballots to 
bullets. Whether that doctrine found its supporters 
north or south of Mason and Dixon’s line depended 
upon whether the Embargo, the Tariff, the Fugitive 
Slave Law or the perpetuation of slavery was the 
question to which it was applied'. As late as 1859, a 
northern state, in dealing with the question of execut¬ 
ing the Fugitive Slave Law, adopted resolutions 
based upon the most ultra state sovereignty prin¬ 
ciples, 1 and these resolutions were approved by the 
popular voice of the entire North, but condemned 
throughout the southern States; yet within two short 
years “State Rights” was the watch-word of the South, 
“National Sovereignty” the slogan of the anti-slavery 
North. In 1812 we denied the “right of search” 
claimed by England and argued the question with the 
sword; but in 1862 when an American officer exer¬ 
cised this right the popular House of Congress ten¬ 
dered him a vote of thanks and the Executive, after 
apologizing to England for the offense, promptly re- 


1. Wisconsin. March 19, 1859, the legislature resolved “that the 
several states that formed the instrument (the U. S. Constitution) 
being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to 
judge of its infractions; and that a positive defiance by these 
sovereignties of all unauthorized acts done under color of that 
instrument, is the rightful remedy.” Alexander Johnston in Lalor’s 
Encyclopedia. 



9 


warded the offender by a material promotion ; 2 and the 
action of the President as well as that of the House 
has been almost universally approved by the Ameri¬ 
can people. 

But it is needless to multiply illustrations; no in¬ 
telligent person will question the fact that either in¬ 
terest or sentiment will fatally impair the judgment of 
the most intelligent and conscientious person, and it 
follows that neither the American court nor the 
Spanish is to be accused of acting in bad faith merely 
because an erroneous decision was reached. Only the 
intentional suppression of unfavorable evidence, or trv 
wilful failure to procure available testimony germane 
to the issue, can fairly subject either court to cen¬ 
sure. But it follows also that the finding of neither 
court is entitled' to serious consideration as a judicial 
act, since according to universally recognized prin¬ 
ciples of jurisprudence neither was competent to de¬ 
cide the question at issue; in each case court, counsel 
and witnesses were all prejudiced the same way with 
feelings wrought to high tension. It was a foregone 
conclusion that in the absence of positive evidence 
one way or the other, the two courts would reach 
diametrically opposite conclusions. 

But there were considerations other than national 
prejudice and personal friendship to influence the de¬ 
cisions of these courts. The members of our own, in 


2. See Sketch of Charles Wilkes In Diet. Am. Biography. 



10 


common with a large majority of the people of the 
United States, were fully persuaded that it was our 
imperative duty to put an end to the horrible state of 
affairs existing in Cuba. This duty the government 
seemed loth to perform. Capital invested in foreign 
commerce was opposed to war and it was feared that 
dollars would prove more potent than duty. If proof 
could be found that this heartrending disaster was 
due either to criminal inefficiency or to fiendish treach¬ 
ery, such a storm of indignation would be aroused 
that government would be forced to abandon its dila¬ 
tory tactics and take a firm stand in behalf of justice 
and humanity. A decision against Spain, even if 
erroneous, would merely bring upon her the just re¬ 
tribution already too long delayed; while a mistake in 
her favor would add one more to a long list of un¬ 
punished crimes. Under such circumstances no stone 
should be left unturned to make a case against the op¬ 
pressor of Cuba, and no facts should be unnecessarily 
uncovered that would weaken the technical case against 
a notorious criminal. Nor is this all. A war with 
Spain must necessarily be largely a naval war, hence 
the navy must be greatly strengthened, involving many 
promotions. Spain was bankrupt, exhausted, and rent 
by civil feuds. Victories under such circumstances 
would be easy and certain. But the laurel is always 
for the victor’s brow regardless of the odds in his 
favor, hence war with Spain was full of promise for 
Sampson and his associates. Again, the first shot 


II 


tired by a Spanish gun would give us a mortgage upon 
all Spain’s numerous and valuable possessions. For 
half a century we had schemed for the acquisition of 
the “Pearl of the Antilles” in the interest of slavery 
and our palms had not yet ceased to itch. To carry 
the Stars and Stripes to richer lands and strike 
Spanish shackles from millions of struggling patriots, 
and at the same time afford thousands of our embryo 
statesmen an opportunity to serve their country in 
teaching these people how to be governed by Anglo 
Saxons, would necessarily inure to the benefit of the 
political party through whose agency these ends should 
be achieved. Under such circumstances an impartial 
investigation was absolutely impossible. 

The Spanish investigators had still stronger reasons 
to wish for the result they found. If it should be 
found that our ship was blown up by design, disas¬ 
trous war and merciless despoilment were believed to 
be inevitable, and these would mean humiliation to the 
Spanish navy in particular, a humiliation that the 
members of this court must share. 

As neither court could 1 possibly conduct a fair in¬ 
vestigation it will ever be a matter of profound regret 
to every true American that our government declined 
Spain’s proposition that both sides should be repre¬ 
sented in the original investigation, 3 that it refused 
to submit the matter to impartial investigation after 


3. Senate Document 230, 65th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 88, 89 
and 91. 



12 


conflicting decisions had been rendered upon ex-parte 
evidence, 4 and finally, when all our d'emands had 
been conceded by Spain, that it again for the third 
time refused an impartial investigation when humbly 
implored by a prostrate foe as a means of purging 
himself of a charge a thousand fold more humiliating 
than all the adverse fortunes of waY. 5 This last re¬ 
fusal must always be the most difficult for us to ex¬ 
plain to the world at large. There was then no 
pressing emergency upon us demanding that we should 
stand together; no national interests were at stake; 
the fires of revenge had been quenched in the blood 
of many thousands of our enemies; we had exacted 
not merely an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, 
but many times the ancient merciless penalty. We 
knew too, that disinterested experts, even those most 
friendly to us, had expressed grave doubts as to the 
justice of our charge. “Engineering,” the leading 
journal of its class in England, had editorially rejected 
the conclusions of our court. 6 Col. Bucknill, R. E., 
who had assisted in conducting the most noted series 
of mine experiments ever undertaken—those upon the 
Obey on —had published his conviction that the mine 
theory not only involved the improbable, but the im¬ 
possible. 7 Admiral Columb, whose expert services in 


4. Special message of Pres. McKinley, April 11, 1898. 

5. Proceedings of Paris Peace Commission, Dec. 2, 1898, reported 
in the American dailies Dec. 3, 1898. 

6. Engineering, London, April 22, 1898. 

7. Engineering, London, July 24, 1898. 



13 


the Dotterel case give his opinions unusual weight, had 
pronounced the mine theory wholly untenable, 8 and 
Prof. Goldwin Smith had asserted that it is the opinion 
of the world’s independent experts that the destruc¬ 
tion of the Maine was the results of an accident. 9 Nine- 
tenths of Christendom had charged us with unfair¬ 
ness in our dealings with Spain, 10 and needlessly to 
give color to the 'charge was more than a diplomatic 
blunder, it was a crime against our country’s fair 
name, andi must forever remain an indelible stain upon 
her sacred escutcheon. To have submitted the ques¬ 
tion to expert investigation would have been evidence 
of faith in the justice of our contention; a favorable 
verdict would have vindicated our claims; while an 
adverse decision could have done nothing more than 
convict us of having reached a hasty conclusion, un¬ 
warranted by a fuller investigation. 

But while our government has refused a fair trial of 
the case it has published in full the testimony on which 
the verdict against Spain was found, and if on ex¬ 
amination this testimony shall be found to fall short 
of a demonstration of guilt, we may strongly suspect 
that had our witnesses been cross-examined by oppos¬ 
ing counsel, and the defendant been allowed to intro- 


8. National Review, June, 1898. 

9. "That the Maine was destroyed by an accidental explosion of 
the kind by which the St. Paul, the Oregon and the Obdam have 
since narrowly escaped destruction, is the opinion of independent 
experts, and may yet be the verdict of history.” Goldwin Smith in 
Forum, November, 1898. 

10. Nlblock. Engineering, Londop, April 26, 1898. 



14 


duce rebutting evidence, even a prejudiced court might 
have failed to convict. And if we find, further, that 
the facts established by an ex-parte investigation do 
not warrant us, with our American prejudices, in heart¬ 
ily approving the findings of our court, we must con¬ 
cede that these facts are utterly inadequate to convince 
the impartial historian who will write the final verdict. 
And if we find still further that important evidence 
easily obtainable, was not procured, and that other 
facts established by the testimony were apparently 
ignored, it will tend still further to impair our con¬ 
fidence in the correctness of the conclusions reached. 

A satisfactory inquiry as to the origin of the ex¬ 
plosion would doubtless involve the services of able 
and unbiased experts, but to determine its character 
and extent and the probable location of the ex¬ 
plosives is a very different problem, since the published 
testimony can easily be understood by anyone who will 
take the trouble to familiarize himself with a few nau¬ 
tical terms, the general structure of an iron ship and 
the special arrangement of certain parts of the Maine 
directly involved in the catastrophe. 

To obtain a general idea of the framework of a 
steel battleship, place the skeleton of a herring upon 
its back. The backbone will represent the keel, and 
each pair of ribs a “frame.” Connect the ribs of each 
pair by four horizontal wires nearly equidistant, and 
we have the “deck-beams.” Connect the ribs and also 
these wires by other wires paraded to the back-bone 


i5 


and a shipbuilder would readily recognize the “longi¬ 
tudinals” and “stringers.” Now imagine this skele¬ 
ton to be enlarged till it will fill an ordinary street 
from curb to curb and the backbone extend from cross¬ 
street to cross-street, while the ribs reach the roofs 
of three-story houses, and we have a fair idea of the 
framework of a vessel 318 feet long, 57 feet “beam” 
and 32 feet from fourth deck to bottom of keel. 

In the Maine the keel was double, consisting of a 
massive compound steel beam placed on edge—the 
“vertical keel”—and below this a similar one upon 
its -side—the “flat keel.” The frames, securely bolted 
to this compound keel, were four feet apart except 
near stem and stern where the distance was somewhat 
less. To allow room for boilers and machinery, the 
two lower decks were left out near the middle of tne 
ship, hence above the boilers there were but the two 
decks that were blown up and thrown back upon the 
comparatively uninjured after part of the vessel. The 
forward boilers were just aft of frame 31, and the 
boiler-room extended from frame 31 to frame 41, 10 
frame spaces, or 40 feet. The spaces between decks 
were divided into numerous small compartments by 
steel partitions called “bulkheads” which, bolted to the 
deck-beams, reinforced the stanchions and increased 
the rigidity of the structure. By reference to plates 11 


11. See Exhibit L, Maine Report (Senate Doc. 207. 55th Congress, 

2d Session) and Hold Plan and Longitudinal section, Affairs In 
Cuba, Senate Report 885, 65th Congress, 2d Session. 

'V 



16 


in government publications it will be seen that the for¬ 
ward magazines were stored in the lowest of these 
rooms between frames 18 and 25. 

With the above facts in mind we are prepared to 
take up the report of the commission, and in the con¬ 
sideration of this report certain preliminary questions 
first claim our attention: the number of distinguish¬ 
able explosions, the time of the destruction of the 
dynamos, etc. 

There were necessarily several explosions, though 
probably but a single perceivable report. Since the 
magazines involved were separated one from another 
by steel bulkheads, whether a given magazine were 
fired' by an adjacent magazine of low explosives, or 
by a mine of high explosives beneath, there would of 
necessity be an actual, though perhaps practically in¬ 
finitesimal, interval between the two explosions, but 
not sensibly greater in the one case than in the other. 
In fact it is hardly possible that the interval could be 
detected by the ear in either case, as suggested by 
Lieut. Holman. More than 40 witnesses testified as 
to the number of explosions, indicating that this was 
regarded as an important matter. At first view the 
testimony appears hopelessly conflicting; but upon 
closer study many of the seeming contradictions can 
be completely harmonized. Sound is transmitted more 
rapidly by water than by air, and still more rapidly 
by iron. The distance traversed in one second through 
iron would require four seconds through water, and 


i7 


sixteen seconds if air were the only medium. An ob¬ 
server on the Maine would get the report of an ex¬ 
plosion in her hold' through the iron framework and 
also through the air, and if the interval between the 
times of receiving it exceeded one-sixteenth of a second, 
it would be heard as two reports differing in character 
according to the medium of transmission. The pos¬ 
sible distance of a witness on board, from an explod¬ 
ing magazine, was 260 feet, and the report would have 
been received through the framework at this distance 
full one-fifth of a second before it could have been 
heard through the air alone. Observers at a less dis¬ 
tance from the magazine would have noted a smaller 
interval—those at seventy feet or less, none at all. 
The report would reach the Washington, 800 feet 
from the magazines, as estimated by. Capt. Sigsbee, 12 
as two reports more than half a second apart. Only 
two distinct reports heard on the after part of the 
Maine or at more distant points would be proof of but 
a single explosion, and witnesses at different distances 
would necessarily observe different intervals between 
the reports heard. Again, the evidence submitted 
proves that single masses of wreckage, weighing many 
tons, fell over upon the uninjured portion of the ves¬ 
sel and necessarily produced tremendous concussions 
that might have been easily mistaken for additional 
explosions, by excited men within the zone of a single 


12. Maine Report, p. 11. 



i8 


distinguishable report. Of the 45 witnesses who testi¬ 
fied as to the number of reports, 15 on board the 
Maine, including the highest officers, testify to a single 
report; 13 10 others bear witness to a jar followed by 
a report, and the first of these testified as an expert that 
both jar and report were the result of the same ex¬ 
plosion. 14 Six persons so located that two reports 


13. I.—Capt. Sigsbee. Q. By the time you reached the quarter¬ 

deck wei'e all the larger explosions over? A. So far as my experi¬ 
ence is concerned there was simply one overwhelming explosion. 
(P. 16). II.—Lieut. Commander Wainwright. Q. Please state your 
experience of the shocks and noises you heard during the explosion. 
A. I only remember one very heavy shock. (P. 27). III.—Pay¬ 
master Ray. Q. Will you please state to the court what shocks you 

experienced and what noises you heard? A. My first impression, 
my first shock, you might say, was a sort of upheaval. After that 
the only explosions I heard were from the City of Washington, of 
the small arms. (P. 38). IV.—Chaplain Chidwick. Q. How many 
shocks did you feel? A. I remember only one. (P. 56). V.—Cadet 

Boyd. Do you remember how many shocks you felt? A. It was 

one continuous shock. Q. One continuous shock was all you felt? 
A. All I felt. (P. 139). VI.—Lieut. Catlin. Q. How many shocks 
did you feel? A. I felt only one, sir. (P. 143). VII.—Carpenter 
Helm. Q. Please state what you felt, heard, and saw during the 
explosions. A. I only heard one report. (P. 149). VIII.—Asst. 

Engineer Morris. Q. Will you please state to the court what you 
felt, heard, and saw of the explosion? A. I was thrown from my 
chair and what I remember of the explosion seemed to me con¬ 
tinuous for an appreciable length of time. (P. 155). IX.—Cadet 
Crenshaw. Q. How many shocks did you feel? A. I can’t say that 
I felt but one, sir. (P. 157). X.—Private McKay. Q. One ex¬ 
plosion? A. One explosion. Q. Was that the shock? A. The shock 
and the explosion was at the same time. (P. 161). XI.—Boats¬ 
wain’s Mate Bergman. Q. Do you remember more than one shock? 
A. That is all, sir. (P. 177). XII.—Landsman Fox. Q. You heard 
but one explosion? A. Yes, sir; but one explosion. (P. 180). XIII— 
Fireman Pank. Q. You heard an explosion on board the ship? A. 
Yes, sir. Q. One or two? A. I only heard one, sir. (P. 186). 
XIV.—Mess Attendant Turpin. Q. You felt but one shock? A. I 
felt only one shock. (P. 192). XV.—Landsman Kane. Q. You 
mean, when you first heard the noise begin, the roar came im¬ 
mediately; or was there an interval? A. It sounded like the gun 
was fired, and you heard the roar for a good while afterwards. 
(P. 201). 

14. I.—Lieut. Holman. Q. Please describe your experience in full? 
A. While conversing with Mr. Jungen and Jenkins, a heavy ex¬ 
plosion occurred, which was evidently in the forward part of the 
ship. This explosion shook the ship violently, and the noise it 



i9 

would necessarily be heard from each explosion, testify 


made consisted of a low grumbling, comparatively speaking, a low 
and heavy grumbling, followed by a heavy booming explosion. It 
was precisely similar to many other submarine explosions I have 
heard, excepting that it was on a much larger scale. A submarine 
explosion always gives two shocks—one transmitted by water, the 
other immediately following—the atmospheric shock. The lights 
went out at once, and we were left in darkness. Q. You have had 
considerable experience at Newport in matters of explosives, I 
believe. What was your impression of the whole affair? A. My 
impression, not verified as yet by what the divers are finding, is 
that a very heavy mine went off under the Maine’s bottom. Q. Did 
you think that the explosion of this mine—remember I am only 
speaking of your impression—was followed by the blowing up of 
the Maine’s magazines? A. The noise produced by a heavy mine 
would be great in itself, and adding this noise to it would probably 
be coincident, (sic), practically forming one and the same ex¬ 
plosion. From the noise alone I can hardly form an opinion 
whether the magazine went off also. (Pp. 22 and 23). II.—Surgeon 
Henneberger. Q. Will you please state to the court what shocks 
you felt and what noises you heard at the time of the explosion? 
A. I felt a sudden upheaving of the ship. The lights were ex¬ 
tinguished, and this was followed immediately by a deep boom, 
as of an explosion. That was all I heard. (P. 39). III.—Private 
Anthony. Q. Please tell the court what you felt and what you saw. 
A. I first noticed a trembling and buckling of the decks, and then 
this prolonged roar—not a short report, but a prolonged roar. 
(P. 40). IV.—Lieut. Blandin, Q. Please state to the court your 
experience of the explosion. A. Mr. Hood was talking to me when 
the explosion occurred. I am under the impression that there 
were two explosions, though I could not be sure of it. Q. You say 
you heard two explosions? A. That is my impression, sir; though 
I could not be positive. I think there were two. Q. Similar ex¬ 
plosions? A. So far as I can judge, sir. When the first explosion 
took place the ship quivered. The shock, as I said, was not so 
great where I was, and my impression is there was a second one, 
but the difference in similarity I could not describe. V.—Lieut. 
Hood. Q. Which was the larger explosion; which gave you the 
greater shock, the first or the second? A. The first was more of a 
feel. I mean, you felt the first explosion more than you saw it. 
I felt the whole ship just go up and tremble and vibrate all 
over. . . . The second was a kind of open explosion. . . . There 
was no appreciable time between these two explosions. (Pp. 120-1). 
Witness was at frame 66, upper deck—interval l-6th of a second. 
VI.—Cadet Bronson. Q. How long after that shock did you feel 
the explosion? A. I cannot state, sir. Q. Was there a distinct 
interval? A. I am not prepared to state, sir. (P. 137). VII.— 
Seaman Moriniere. Q. Tell the court exactly what you felt, what you 
heard, and what you saw. A. I heard a jar, and after this jar 
the explosion went up through the middle superstructure. I heard 
a Jar first, and almost the same time of this jar the whole middle 
superstructure went up in fire, sir. Q. What did the explosion feel 
like to you? A. Just a jar, sir. (P. 176). VIII.—Seaman Larsen. 
Q. Can you describe more carefully the first shock? A. It was 



20 


that but two were heard . 13 Six others more or less 
injured by the explosion that destroyed the decks, 
knew nothing of any preceding explosion . 16 But the 


just a jar, shaking all over. Q. Was there a distinct interval 
between the two, do you think? A. There was a very little between 
each other, because I didn’t have time to turn around. (P. 174). 
IX.—Fireman Gartrell. Q. You felt the ship tremble before this 
explosion? A. Before this explosion; yes, sir. (P. 189). X.—Sea¬ 
man McCann. Q. Was the first shock that you felt accompanied 
by any sound; was there any report? A. No; not the jar. There 
was no report to the jar, sir. Q. Then there was but one report, 
was there? A. That is all I remember hearing; there might have 
been more. Q. That is what we want. You heard only one report, 
but you felt the jar before the report came? A. Yes, sir. 

15. I.—Wm. H. VanSyckel. Q. Please state to the court what 
sound you first heard that made you leave your house and go out. 
What was the nature of it? A. First a rumble. Then a terrific 
explosion. That rumble startled us and then the explosion was 
almost instantaneous. (P. 50). II.—Capt. Teasdale, Bark Deva. 
Q. How many explosions did you hear? A. I heard two distinct 
explosions. The first one was very sharp one, and when that 
explosion took place it was as though some steamer had collided, 
and the shock was something tremendous. Q. That is to your 
own ship? A. Yes; I am alluding to my own vessel at the present 
time. Then there was a tremendous explosion after that. (P. 54). 
III.—Sigmund Rothschild, passenger on board the City of Wash¬ 
ington. Q. You are certain there was a distinct interval between 
the first shot and the blowing up? A. Sure, because it was the 
shot which made me look first in that direction. (P. 60). IV.— 
Louis Wertheimer, on board the City of Washington. Q. Please tell 
us what you heard and saw. A. I heard a report, a minor report, 
minor in comparison with the greater report which immediately fol¬ 
lowed, and at an interval of anywhere from five to fifteen seconds 
following this first minor report came a great explosion. After¬ 
ward said he had overestimated the time. (P. 63). V.—First 
Officer Cornell, City of Washington. Q. What interval was there 
between the rumbling noise and the explosion? A. I think there 
must have been about fifteen or sixteen seconds—not a full minute. 
Q. That is, a long time? A. Almost immediately; there was not 
much of an interval. (P. 219). VI.—Capt. Stevens, City of Wash¬ 
ington. Q. Please tell the court what you heard and saw. A. I 
heard a dull, muffled explosion, and commotion, like as though it 
was under water, followed instantly by a terrific explosion. 
(P. 220). 

16. I.—Boatswain Larkin. Q. Please describe what you felt and 
saw. A. I remember hearing an explosion. I do not remember 
the violence of it. I was struck on the head about the same time 
and dazed. (P. 147). II.—Apprentice Dressier. Q. Tell the court 
exactly what you felt, heard and saw. A. I didn’t feel anything, 
nor I didn’t see anything. ... I didn’t feel no shock, nor I didn’t 
see anything at all. Q. The first thing you knew was when you 
recovered from being knocked senseless? A. Yes, sir. (P. 165). 



21 


V 


court found these decks to have been blown up by the 


magazines, hence the testimony of these wit¬ 



nesses must be included in that favoring the theory of 
but one report. This makes 37 that must be counted 
as testifying either directly or indirectly to a single 
explosion. Of the remaining eight, five testify to two 
quite distinct reports, 17 one, to two shocks and a very 


III. —Sergeant Meehan. Q. State exactly what you felt, heard and 

saw. A. I was in the gangway w'hen I first heard this explosion. 
The next thing I knew about it I w r as fired overboard. Lifted 

clean off the gangway and fired into the water. The next thing 
I was picked up by a boat. Q. You heard only one explosion? 
A. Only one explosion. Q. Did you feel any shock before that 
explosion? A. The explosion and the shock, I thought, was 
both together. Q. Were you knocked senseless? A. No. (P. 167). 

IV. —Corporal Thompson. Q. Did you go up in the air at the 

very first shock you felt? A. That was the first thing I realized. 
(P. 168). V.—Seaman Rau. Q. How many explosions did you 

hear? A. I didn’t hear none at all. Was awake; not stunned, but 
blown overboard. (P. i87). VII.—Seaman Mattson. Q. State 

exactly what you felt, saw, and heard. A. It was just the same 
as if I seen lots of smoke, and I went right up in the air. I don't 
know w f here I went to. After that I didn’t remember till I was 
lying aft on the quarter-deck. Q. You felt only one shock? A. 
Yes, sir. Q. And that landed you on the quarter-deck? A. Yes, 
sir. (P. 190). 

17. I.—Cadet Holden. Q. Will you please state to the court 
what shock you experienced and what noises you heard at the 
time of the explosion? A. At the time of the explosion, first, there 
was an explosion of considerable force, and about three or four 
seconds afterwards there was another explosion of far greater 
force, and a terrible shaking. (P. 31). II.—Lieut. Blow. Q. Will 
you state to the court what you experienced during that explosion? 
A. I was writing at the time, and heard forward, and apparently 
at some distance, that is to say, well up in the bow, as far as I 
could judge by the sound—an explosion. Instantly the lights 
went out. I rushed out of my room to see the cause of it, and 
before I could get more than probably six feet from my room a 
second and more violent explosion followed. This second explosion 
I would describe as being a continuous explosion, lasting for several 
seconds, and accompanied by the falling of lights, electrical fittings, 
furniture, and by a crashing and rending of metal. III.—Apprentice 
Ham. Q. Tell the court exactly what you felt, heard and saw of the 
destruction of the Maine. A. I was facing forward when I saw a 
fiash of light—a flame, which seemed to envelop the whole ship— 
followed by a report. I was struck in the face by a flying piece 
of Iron. Then there was a perfect hail of flying iron, that fell all 
about me. Then the second report. Q. You speak of two reports? 



22 


great vibration; 18 one, to a “series of convulsions/’ 
and a crash; 19 one, to a “deafening roar,” a “tremend¬ 
ous crash,” and three “explosions.” 20 Such discrep¬ 
ancies are readily explained in the manner above in¬ 
dicated, upon the theory of a single explosion, hence 
the testimony of the eight does not, in any appreciable 
degree, neutralize that of the 37. But upon the charac- 


A. Yes, sir; it sounded like a roar, the second one. Q. What did the 

first one sound like? A. It was a sharp report. Q. How far were they 

apart? A. There was an interval of a couple of seconds. (P. 162). 

IV. —Master of Arms Load. Q. Please state to the court what you 

felt, heard and saw. A. You could see a red flame outside the 
ship. It seemed as if it was a small boat had struck the ship 
first. She seemed to tremble, and then the whole deck where I 
was standing seemed to open, and there was a flash of flame came 
up. Then I found myself below and could hear a second explosion. 
Q. How did the second report differ from the first one? A. It 
didn’t seem to be as loud a report, as the first one was. Q. It 

did not seem to be as loud? A. Not as loud, sir. (Pp. 171, 173). 

V. —Coal Passer Melville. Q. Tell the court exactly what you 
felt, heard and saw. A. I felt something like electrician right 
under my feet. Q. An electric shock, I suppose you mean? A. 
Yes, sir; and she listed over on the port side. The port was under 
water. I made my way to the starboard gangway, and then I 
heard the second report. Q. How long was it before the explosion 
occurred after the first shock? A. It appeared to be about a half 
minute between the two explosions. Q. Almost immediately, do 
you think? Half a minute, you know, is quite a little space. A. 
The first explosion raised up part of the superstructure, etc., and 
twisted it right over my head. I made under it for the starboard 
gangway. When I got to the starboard gangway the second 
explosion occurred. 

18. VI.—Cadet Cluverius. Q. Will you please state to the court 
what shocks you experienced and what next you heard? A. My first 
knowledge of anything occurring was a slight shock as if a 
6-pounder gun had been fired somewhere about the deck. After 
that a very great vibration in my room, which was then followed 
by a very heavy shock, and still continued vibration and rushing 
of water through the junior officers’ mess room, and the sound 
as if something breaking up all the time. (P. 30.) 

19. Chief Engineer Howell. Q. Will you please state to the 
court what noises you heard and what shocks you felt at the 
time of the explosion? A. I was suddenly startled with an unusual 
shock. There was a continuous series of convulsions 

then a tremendous crash; then apparently the sound of falling 
debris. (P. 34.) 

20. Lieut. Jungen. Q. Will you please describe to the court your 
experiences of the explosion, all you saw, heard, and felt up to 
the time that the whole thing was over? A. It (the initial dis- 





23 


ter of the explosion we have reliable expert testimony. 
H. M. S. Dotterel is known to have been destroyed 
by the explosion of her magazines, and Vice Admiral 
Columb who, as government expert, reviewed the re¬ 
port of the Doterel commission, has carefully ex¬ 
amined the report of our court of inquiry, as published 
in Senate Document 207, 55th Congress, 2d Session. 
Commenting upon the report in The National Review 
(London), June ’98, he uses the following language: 
“Reading the evidence that was before the U. S. 
Commission, is like re-reading the evidence that was 
before our own court (Sic) in all that pertains to the 
character of the explosion.” Yet upon this testimony 
our court found as follows: “There were two ex¬ 
plosions of a distinctly different character with a very 
short but distinct interval between them. ,, 

The dynamos were 18 feet above the keel and from 
36 to 44 feet abaft of frame 18. Between this frame 
and the dynamos were nearly all the forward maga¬ 
zines. Of course it would be possible for a mine at 
frame 18 to destroy dynamos so situated without first 
exploding the intervening magazines, but, to say the 
least, such a thing would be highly improbable. And 
when we consider further that these dynamos were 


turbance) was not an explosion. It was a dull, deafening roar, 
followed immediately by a tremendous crash. . . . As I was 

coming up the ladder I heard three—I think it was three—distinct 
explosions. One of them was more powerful than the other two. 
Q. Did you not testify to two shocks, two explosions? A. I tes¬ 
tified to the original roar and crash, and then, as I remember, 
three distinct explosions, one of them being more violent than 
the rest of them. (Pp. 132 and 134.) 



24 


directly over the magazines found’ by the court to have 
exploded, and between these magazines and the decks 
found to have been blown up by their explosion, we 
can have no reasonable doubt that the dynamos were 
destroyed by the magazines. As the dynamos were 
40 feet astern of frame 18, a mine at that frame could 
not break the currents to the after part of the vessel, 
so we may safely assume that the lights in this part 
of the ship were extinguished' by the destruction of 
the dynamos themselves. No attempt was made by the 
court to ascertain when the-lights went out. Twelve 
witnesses state incidentally that the lights went out 
at the beginning of the disaster, but none of these were 
cross-examined upon this point. 21 One stated in the 


21. I.—Capt. Sigsbee. Q. Please state your experience in full. 
A. I was just finishing a letter to my family when I felt the crash 
of the explosion. It was a bursting, rending and crashing sound 
or roar of immense volume, largely metallic in its character. It 
was succeeded by a metallic sound—probably the falling debris— 
a trembling and lurching motion of the vessel, then an impression 
of subsidence, attended by an eclipse of the electric lights and 
intense darkness within the cabin. Q. By the time you 

reached the cabin were all the larger explosions over? A. So far 
as my experience is concerned there was simply one impression 
of an overwhelming explosion. (Pp. 15-16.) II.—Lieut. Holman. 
(See note 14, I, above.) III.—Surgeon Henneberger. Q.—Will you 
please state to the court what shocks you experienced and what 
noises you heard? A. I was lying in my bunk reading, and I felt 
a sudden upheaving of the ship. The lights were extinguished, 
and this was followed immediately by a deep boom, as of an 
explosion. (P. 30.) IV.—Captain Chidwick. Q. Please state to the 
court what shocks you felt, what noises you heard, and what 
you saw in regard to the explosion. A. I heard a loud report, 
and everything became dark as soon as I heard the report. The 
lights were out and there was a crashing sound of things falling. 
(P. 56.) V.—Cadet Boyd. Q. Please state what you saw, heard and 
felt. A. I was sitting in the steerage reading at the time. The 
lights went out. A crashing booming was heard. (P. 139.) • VI.— 
Lieut. Blow. Q. (See note 17, II.) VII.—Cadet Bronson. Q. Please 
describe what you heard and felt and saw. A. My first impression 
was that a salute was being fired. That was before the crash 



25 


same casual way that the lights went out subsequent 
to the “deafening roar,” and he was cross-questioned 
and led to say that he thought the dynamos were de¬ 
stroyed' by the second explosion. 22 This witness was 
in the same room with Lieut. Holman, who testified 
to a single explosion extinguishing the lights “at once.” 
Both questions and answers assume that the dynamos 
were destroyed by the explosion that wrecked the ves¬ 
sel amidships, and, as above intimated, the facts fully 
warrant the assumption, indeed no other hypothesis 
seems tenable. But the evidence is conclusive that, 
however many explosions there may have been, the 


came. That is the impression that I have now. That was the 
first thought that entered my mind. Then my bunk was lifted 
beneath me, and the ship listed over to port. The lights were 
out and I heard the water rushing outside in the passageway. Q. 
How long after that shock did you feel the explosion? A. I cannot 
state, sir. Q. Was there a list of the ship at the first explosion? 
A. Almost simultaneously with the explosion. (P. 137.) (Observe 
that shock, report and list were practically coincident, leaving the 
lights out.) VIII.—Lieut. Catlin. Q. How many shocks did you 

feel? A. I felt but one, sir. Q. The lights went out at that 

shock? A. Yes sir; immediately. (P. 143.) IX.—Cadet Crenshaw. 
Q. Please state to the court what you felt, heard and saw of 
the destruction of the Maine. A. I don’t remember hearing any¬ 
thing. The lights went out, and I felt a shock, but I don’t re¬ 
member of hearing a noise of any kind. (P. 157.) X.—Master 
at Arms Load. Q. Were the lights out at this time? A. The 

lights were out as soon as the first flash. (P. 173.) XI. Fireman 

Gantrell. Describing ©vents immediately following the only explo¬ 
sion he heard, says; “The two of us jumped up, and I went on 
the port side of the engine-room ladder, and Frank Gardner, he 
went up the starboard side—at least he didn’t go up, because he 
hollered to me. He struck the door right where the partition 
separates the two doors, and he must have struck his head. 
Everything was pitch dark.” (Pp. 188.) XII.—Mess Attendant 
Turpin. “It was a jarring explosion—just one solid explosion, and 
the ship heaved and lifted like that, and then all was dark. (P. 
191.) 

22. Lieut. Jungen. “There was sufficient interval between the 
time it took me to get from the end of that table to the door 
opposite in the mess room before the lights were extinguished, so 
that I saw what appeared to me a thick dust or ashes or brown 



26 


lights went out ^jt the first; hence there remains hardly 
the shadow of *a doubt that the first explosion de¬ 
stroyed the decks above the boilers. In other words, 
the first explosion was that ^of the ship’s magazines. 
But, the finding of the court is that “the second ex¬ 
plosion was caused by the partial explosion of two or 
more of the forward magazines of the Maine,” and the 
decks were blown up by this explosion. 

Little importance should be attached to such move¬ 
ments of the Maine as might be noted in the excite¬ 
ment immediately following the disaster. If destroy¬ 
ed by her magazines, the forward part of the un¬ 
injured portion would immediately be lifted, as will be 
explained below. If destroyed by a mine at frame 18 
a lift would also occur, but the movement of 7,000 
tons of material would not be instantaneous. In 
either case a vessel so injured would soon begin to 
sink, and in the excitement it would be difficult to note 
these movements and distinguish them carefully. Of 
23 witnesses on board the Maine cross-examined upon 
this point, 13—three of whom were standing or walk¬ 
ing at the time—say they noticed no movement at the 


smoke.” Q. You have not stated whether the big explosion was 
the first or the second or the third, and you have not stated 
definitely at which time the lights went out. A. The first explo¬ 
sion, as I said, was a dull, deafening roar, followed immediately 
by a crash. By the time I got to the door, I should say, the 
lights all went out. Then there was another explosion, which was 
more violent than any explosion I had heard, that I could not 
liken to anything except possibly the explosion of a magazine. Q. 
When did the lights go out with reference to this second explO' 
sion? A. About simultaneously. Q. Then you think the dynamc 
may have been destroyed at the second explosion? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And not by the first? A. Not by the first. 




27 


first shock. 23 Of the eight who report a movement at 
this time, four say the vessel was ‘‘picked up” or 
“lifted,” 24 while the other report only a lurching, a 
swaying, or a listing. 25 Four witnesses on board the 


23. Lieut. Holman. Q. When you first heard the rumbling noise 

you spoke of, did the ship list either way? A. Not as far as I 
observed. II. Lieut. Commander Wainwright. Q. Did the ship list 
any at this time? A. The first I noticed was after we commenced 
lowering the boats—a list to port. (P. 27.) III.—Chief Engineer 
Howell. Q. Did you notice any list of the ship at the first explo¬ 
sion or the first shock? A. No, sir. (P. 34.) IV.—Paymaster Ray. 

Q. At the first shock you felt, did you notice any perceptible list 
of the ship? A. No, sir. (P. 38.) V.—Surgeon Henneberger. Q. 
What I wish to know is whether, at the very first shock you felt, 
there was a perceptible list. A. No. (P. 39.) VI.—Lieut. Blandin. 
Q. When you first felt the explosion did you notice any list of 
the ship? A. None whatever. (P. 114.) VII.—Lieut. Hood. Q. 

What I mean is, did the ship give a sudden list either to starboard or 
port at the first explosion, as if something had struck on her side? 
A. I didn’t notice any special list at the first shot. (P. 121.) 

VIII.—Lieut. Blow. Q. Did the first explosion, or whatever it 
was, list the ship any? A. I think not. (P. 130.) IX.—Lieut. 
Jungen. Q. Was there any perceptible list or lifting of the ship 
at the first explosion? A. I did not notice that. (P. 134.) X.— 
Cadet Boyd. Q. Was there any list of the ship? A. Not till 
we got into the passage. (P. 140.) XI.—Lieut. Catlin. Q. Did she 
seem to be lifted at the time of the shock? A. I didn’t notice it, 
sir. (P. 143.) XII.—Carpenter Helm. Q. Did the ship seem to 
shake or shiver any during this report? A. None that I can 
remember. (P. 149.) XIII. Apprentice Ham: Q. Did you feel any 
trembling or shaking or lifting of the ship at the first explosion? 
A. No. sir. (P. 162.) 

24. I. Cadet Holden. Q. Did the ship list during either of these 

explosions? A. She seemed to be picked up and listed slightly 
to starboard. Q. Was that the first or second explosion? A. It 
seemed to me to be the first. (P. 31.) II. Cadet Bronson. Q. 
Was there a list of the ship at the first explosion? A. Almost 
simultaneously with the explosion. Q. There was a list? A. Yes, 
sir. Q. Which way? A. To port. Q. The ship settled to port? 
A. Yes, sir. Q. But she never was lifted up? A. I was lying in 
my bunk and I felt my bunk lifted under me. Q. That was at 
the first shock? A. The first shock; yes, sir. (P. 137.) III.— 
Private McKay. Q. The ship seemed to rise, did it? A. Yes, sir, 
it seemed as if something lifted her up and tipped her right 
over on the port side. (P. 161.) IV.—Mess Attendant Turpin. 

Q. Lift which way? A. She lifted up and listed to port. (P. 191.) 

25. —I. Private Anthony. Q. Did you notice any perceptible list 
of the ship at the first shock? A. At the first shock the ship 
instantly—that is, the quarter deck where I was standing—dipped 
forward and to port, just like that (indicating). It apparently 
broke in the middle like that (indicating) and surged forward, and 



28 


City of Washington state that they were looking di¬ 
rectly at the Maine at the time of the explosion, or an 
instant afterwards, but they did not all see the same 
things. One says that her bow was lifted slightly at 
the first explosion and the whole vessel to a marked 
degree at the second, but less at the stern. 26 Another 
says there was no upheaval at the “first shot,” but 
that the Maine rose about three yards at the second 
explosion. 27 The third saw no movement at all, 28 
but the fourth saw a great deal. 29 His testimony is 
that she “lifted most nearly all out of water,” and that 
he “saw her raising by her lights,” which, it will be 
remembered, were instantly extinguished by this ex- 

i—. - . . , - - — - ■■ - ■■ — . - ■ 

then canted over to port. (P. 40.) II. Chaplain Chidwick. Q. 
Did you notice any list of the ship when that shock was experi¬ 
enced. A. It struck me that I did, to the port side. I am not 

positive about that. (P. 56.) III. Naval Cadet Crenshaw. Q. How 

many shocks did you feel? A. I can’t say that I felt but one, 
sir. Q. Was it a lurch of the ship or a shaking of the ship, or 

what? A. It seemed to be a lurch of the ship. (P. 157.) IV.— 

Fireman Gartrell. Q. You felt only one continuous shaking? A. 
Yes, sir. (P. 189.) 

26. Sigmund Rothschild. Q. You saw the ship move at each 
of the explosions? A. At the first shot the bow of the boat just 
lifted about that much (indicating). At the second one it was more 
of an upheaval of the hull, with the exception of less here at 
the stern. (P. 61.) 

27. Louis Wertheimer. Q. I am now referring to the first shot 
you heard. Did you notice any movement together with that? A. 
No, not at all. In this same burst of flame which followed this 
immense upheaval I saw, clearly and plainly, the vessel rise in 
the water a distance which apparently was three yards, but which 
in reality must have been greater, and then settle down before 
the light of the explosion went out. (P. 63.) 

28. Capt. Stevens, City of Washington. Q. Did you see the Maine 
lift at all? A. I did not, I being on the opposite side and looking 
through. I seen her mainmast and part of her outline, but I 
didn’t see her lift. (P. 220.) 

29. First Officer Cornell. Q. How much did she lift at the first 
sound you heard? A. She lifted most nearly all out of the water. 
She raised up considerably, but it was kind of dark, and how high 
she lifted up I couldn’t exactly say. We saw her raising by her 
lights. (P. 219.) 



29 


plosion. Upon this testimony the court found that “the 
forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree 
at the time of the first explosion.” 

The testimony established the fact that bunker 
“A16” containing 40 tons of soft coal was separated 
from room A14, containing several tons of powder, by 
only a steel bulkhead against which the powder tanks 
rested, 30 yet the official statement is that “ bunker A16 
was accessible on three sides at all times, and on the 
fourth side at this time on account of bunkers B4 and 
B6 being empty.” 

Engineer Bowers, who alone testified as to the 
condition of the thermostats, says they didn’t work 
very well, sometimes ringing when the bunkers were 
empty, 31 but the report states that they were in work¬ 
ing order. 

Throughout the entire proceedings there was mani¬ 
fested a strong desire to establish facts tending to sup¬ 
port the theory of a submarine mine, and thus relieve 
the officers and crew of the Maine from any sus¬ 
picion of negligence. This intense desire, as natural 
as it was commendable, necessarily tended to incline 
the court to give undue weight to evidence favorable 


30. Gunner Hill. Q. I will show you the plan. This bulkhead 
(pointing to a fore and aft bulkhead) divides the magazine from 
coal bunker A16. Did powder touch that bulkhead in its stowage? 
A. Yes, sir; it did aft here. Q. It did in the after part of the 
magazine? A. Yes sir; and it did in the forward part, too, be¬ 
cause there was a lot of saluting powder stowed there. (P. 144.) 

31. P. A. Engineer Bowers. Q. Did you have the usual thermos¬ 
tats in the bunkers? A. Yes, sir; but they didn’t work very well. 
Sometimes they would ring when there was no coal in the bunker. 
(P. 164.) 



30 


to this theory and to discredit witnesses who gave un¬ 
favorable testimony, and thus affords an explanation 
of the remarkable findings cited above without calling 
in question the motives of anyone concerned. Under 
all the circumstances it was impossible that the evi¬ 
dence should be impartially weighed, and equally im¬ 
possible to say how much bias is consistent with an 
honest effort to ascertain facts. But an accident is 
not proof of negligence—the evidence conclusively 
demonstrates that all ordinary precautions had been 
observed by all on board—hence we may proceed with 
our investigations without fear of harming either the 
living or the dead of that unfortunate crew. 

From the temper of the court as indicated by its pub¬ 
lished proceedings, we should expect the official re¬ 
port to deal largely with the state of discipline main¬ 
tained, the precautionary measures employed to avoid 
accidents, etc. In this expectation we are not dis¬ 
appointed: Fifty-two lines are devoted to the excul¬ 
pation of officers and crew, while but seven are given 
to the explosion and iS to the condition of the wreck. 
Except in the two items already mentioned, the find¬ 
ings under the first head are fully warranted by the 
testimony, and the prolixity of the report is pointed 
out merely as further evidence of the bias of the court. 
As to the number of explosions and the attendant move¬ 
ments of the vessel the findings have already been 
noticed. Under the third head the court finds as 
follows: “A portion of the port side of the protective 


3i 


deck, which extends from about frame 30 to frame 41, 
was blown up, aft, and over to port. The main deck, 
from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown 
up, aft, and slightly over to starboard, folding the 
forward part of the middle superstructure over and 
on top of the after part. This was, in the opinion of 
the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or 
more of the forward magazines of the Maine. 

“At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a 
point iiy 2 feet from the middle line of the ship, and 
6 feet above the keel when in its normal position, has 
been forced up so as to be now about 4 feet above the 
surface of the water, therefore about 34 feet above 
where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured. The 
outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V shape 
(A), the after wing of which, about 15 feet broad and 
32 feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is 
doubled back upon itself against the continuation of 
the same plating, extending forward. At frame 18 
the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel 
bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the 
outside bottom plating. This break is now about 6 
feet below the surface of the water, and about 30 feet 
above its normal position. In the opinion of the court 
this effect could have been produced only by the ex¬ 
plosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the 
ship at about frame 18 and somewhat on the port 
side of the ship.” 

It will be seen that, briefly stated, the court found 


32 


that the Maine was injured in two distinct and dis¬ 
similar ways: i. Portions of the port side of the two 
decks over the boiler-room were blown up and folded 
back. 2. A section of the bottom of the vessel 15 by 
32 feet, forward of the boiler-room on the port side 
was driven in and, with the adjacent portion of the 
keel, forced upward till some parts were 34 feet above 
their normal position. But, as will be seen further on, 
these injuries were but a small part of destructive 
effects so extensive as to include the practical annihi¬ 
lation of almost the entire forward half of the vessel, 
the small part that favored the theory of two unlike 
explosions. 

The conclusion reached in the first paragraph 
quoted has never been seriously questioned, but that 
arrived at in the second has not met with the same 
favor. It must be admitted, however, that at first 
glance, the mine theory seems plausible. Surely some 
tremendous force operated from below—what could 
it have been if not a mine? An answer to this ques¬ 
tion should be given before objections to the mine 
theory are urged. 

By reference to plates furnished by the Government 
Printing Office (see “Affairs in Cuba’’) we are able 
to locate definitely the magazines referred to in first 
paragraph, and learn something of the structure of 
the ship. From plate marked “Hold Plan” we learn 
that these magazines occupied several rooms situated 
between frame 18 and frame 30 and extending from 


33 


bunker A16 to middle line of ship, and that from 
frame 30 to frame 41 was a boiler room. Referring 
now to another plate—“Longitudinal Section”—we see 
that above these magazines there appear to be four 
decks, two of which extend over the boiler-room. In 
these ammunition rooms were stored many tons of 
powder—in A14, separated from the 40 tons of soft 
coal in bunker A16 by only a one-quarter inch steel 
plate, there were about 12,000 pounds—in A13 not less 
than 20,000 pounds (Maine Report, p. 292). 

Let us now inquire how far the explosion of “two 
or more of the magazines” will account for the condi¬ 
tion of things set forth in the report and established 
by the evidence. 

Having noted that the magazines were nearly 20 
feet below the surface of the water, we first inquire 
as to the probable effect of the explosion of only a 
few tons of powder out of the immense quantity stored 
in the Maine's forward magazines. Certainly the first 
effect would be to shatter everything in the immediate 
vicinity of the explosives—the decks above with their 
ponderous plates and deck-beams, and that beneath 
with its supporting frames and reverse angle-irons. 
The outer plating, however, being water-tamped, 
would not be blown downward', but immediately be¬ 
neath the exploding magazines would doubtless be 
seamed and fractured, especially along the frames and 
longitudinals. The downward stroke received by 
the inner plating and transmitted' to the frames would 


34 


drive them against the outer plating and would cause 
it to be bent in between the frames exactly as if the 
water were driven against it instead of it against the 
water. 32 “It is thought that an explosion of this kind 
would be in its nature progressive, and the accumula¬ 
tion of gases would become more and more rapid till 
all obstacles were removed” (Commander Converse, 
Maine Report, p. 273). If our expert’s theory is 
correct there would be a slight interval during which 
the expansive force of the accumulating gases would 
be exerted downward upon the water through the 
broken but water-borne plating, and upward against 
the superincumbent decks, and would thus tend to 
lift the forward part of the vessel. If a tenth part of 
the powder should explode we might expect every¬ 
thing in this part of the ship to be blown overboard, 
and the sides of the vessel above the water-line to be 
blown away. The fore and aft force of the gases would 
meet with more resistance above the water-line and 
might break the shell in two, both forward and aft of 
the region of complete interior destruction. The for¬ 
ward part being small and supported against forward 
pressure at and near the keel only, while acted upon by 
explosive force from keel to highest deck, would tend 
to roll forward, lifting the keel at forward fracture 


32. Chief Gunner’s Mate Olsen and Wm. H. Dwyer testify that in 
the region of greatest injury the inner plating of the double bottom 
is driven downward just as the outer plating is driven upward. 
This condition of things would necessarily result from an internal 
explosion, but cannot be accounted for upon the mir > theory. (Pp. 
71-234-275. 



35 

and initiating a rotary motion about an axis parallel 
to the beams. 

This would complete the direct effect of the ex¬ 
plosion, but we have yet to trace its indirect effects. 
At this instant we have an immense shell 96 feet long 
and from 30 feet wide at frame 17 to 57 feet at frame 
41. Upon this huge box-girder there is acting an up¬ 
ward pressure of 2,500 tons and a lateral pressure of 
1,400. Running through the bottom of this shell is 
the keel binding the 50 or 60 feet of intact prow to 
the uninjured after half of the ship. By the break¬ 
ing of frames and the destruction of stanchions, beams, 
decks and bulkheads the shell has lost much more than 
its “factor of safety” and must yield to the enormous 
pressure which it has till now sustained. That part 
of the port side under the magazines—the part from 
frame 18 to frame 30—has been most injured by the 
explosion and will first yield to the upward pressure. 
But the entire bottom must quickly follow, and as it 
rises the keel must either bend or break. If it bends, the 
two uninjured parts of the vessel must be drawn to¬ 
ward each other. The after part of the forward sec¬ 
tion has already been started upward by the rotary mo¬ 
tion imparted as before explained, and will be drawn up 
still more by the bending keel. The 200 tons of longitu¬ 
dinal pressure upon the prow will cooperate with the 
keel as the latter hauls the forward section aft, while 
the bending of our “box-girder” will break what is 
left of its side flanges, or part them where already 


3 ^ 


broken by the explosion. The momentum acquired 
by this forward section from the pull of the keel and 



and the keel may be bent into a very acute angle, in 
which case this angle will be forced to a considerable 
height before the mass finally comes to rest, stem 
first, in the muddy harbor bottom. The upheaval of 
keel and bottom plating is therefore fully explained 
without assuming a mine explosion. 

The official report indicates no such extensive de¬ 
struction as above described. Indeed it very inade¬ 
quately describes—not to say grossly misrepresents— 
the condition in which the wreck was found. The 
published evidence proves beyond peradventure that 
the destruction was as thorough and far-reaching as 
that above outlined, and not unlike it in character. 33 


33. I.—Gunner’s Mate Rundquist. Q. Yet you say that it (the 
armor plate) was not resting on anything but mud? A. It was rest¬ 
ing on the mud. There was a big piece of the ship there that 
was entirely gone. The bottom of the ship was all blown up. 
There was nothing there. (P. 91). II.—Ensign Powelson. 
He (Rundquist) went down near the conning tower supports, 
as before, and got into the mud and walked into the 
ship’s side. He followed it forward until he came to the 
break. I was able to distinguish the bubbles more clearly 
this time, and concluded that the break in the ship’s side was at 
the same frame as the frame on the port side—frame 41. (P. 214.) 

Q. Will you please tell the court, as far as you can, the condi¬ 
tion of the wreck? A. The forward part of the ship, forward of 

the after smoke pipe, has been completely destroyed as far as 

all appearances go. Q. You think the ship on the port side oppo¬ 

site that support is entirely gone? A. Yes, sir. .Q. Entirely blown 
Away? A. Yes, sir. (Page 4 3.) III. Gunner Morgan. Q. What is 
the condition of the port side of the ship? A. The place I was at 
was all gone. (P. 67.) IV. Gunner’s Mate Olsen. Q. Where did 
you find the bottom entirely blown away? A. Right about here 
(indicating). Q. Between frames 24 and 28? A. Yes, sir. Q. 
Oo you think the ship is cut right in two there (at frame 41). 
It is cut in two from out here to pretty near the midship line. 



37 


Our divers all testify that from frame 18 to frame 41 
the interior of the vessel was utterly destroyed— 
stores, stanchions, bulkheads, decks, everything car¬ 
ried away; the shell was found broken and extensively 


(P. 75.) V.—Gunner’s Mate Smith. Q. You described that forward 
portion of the 6-inch reserve magazine as being entirely gone. 
The outside of the ship nas entirely disappeared? A. Yes sir. Q. 
There is a hole through the bottom of the ship at that point? A. 
The side and everything is gone right away from it. Q. Then, 
there must be a hole through the ship? Yes, sir. Q. How high 
up does that extend—that hole? Here is the side of the ship, 
now, and you go down underneath. This is entirely gone, a cer¬ 
tain portion of it (indicating)? A. Entirely gone; yes, sir. Q. 
How high up on the side does it extend, or is that all gone, clear 
up to the water? A. Yes, sir; you can take me and lower me 
right down from the diving launch down into the mud, and I 
can walk. Q. That might be, too, and if you were inside of the 
ship there might be continuous metal outside of you. A. No, sir. 
Q. Suppose the part you say is blown away is a hole with a 
portion of the ship’s side still over it. Could you walk athwart- 
ships out of the ship or into the ship without catching your tubes 
and life-lines? A. No, sir; I could not. Q. Then if there were 
portions of the ship still standing above the hole? A. I could feel 
my life lines hauling over it. Besides, I have a guide line right 
from the diving lines down, and made fast into the shell room— 
into the after part of it. (Pp. 81-82). VI.—Seaman Reden. Q. 
Tell the court all you saw down there. A. The first time I went 
down I went down where the dynamo room is. There is nothing 
left there whatever, only some plates and beams. I cannot tell 
if there has been a dynamo there, or anything else. Everything 
gone entirely. . . . As I walk along forward from aft on the 
port side, there is nothing left of the ship whatever, out for 30 
feet I should think. Everything is gone underneath there. You 
can walk from the bottom right into the ship, only you go down in 
the mud about two feet. Q. How far toward the starboard side 
of the ship did you go when you were down? A. I must have 
been, I should judge, away over—right where the turret ought to be. 
Q. You do not think there was any ship’s side left there? A. No, 
sir. Q. When you went down did you recognize anything that 
you can describe? A. I couldn’t recognize nothing, sir. I know 
the compartments w r ell, and if I seen anything I could have recog¬ 
nized them; but there was nothing left to recognize, sir. (Pp. 83- 
84-85-87.) VII.—Chief Gunner’s Mate Olsen. Q. Please state what 
you found. A. ... I found where I w r ent down, at frame 31, 
at the armor plate, that I could feel the bottom of the ship forward 
for ten frame spaces. At the end of ten frame spaces and at 
frame 31, I found her to be cut off entirely. (P. 249.) VIII.—Capt. 
Sigsbee. Q. The walls amidships on both sides, to nearly amid¬ 
ships, were broken down? A. Especially so; very much disinte¬ 
grated. It is all gone on the port side. (Affairs in Cuba, P. 484. 
See also Pp. 69. 70. 71. 72. 74, 86, 90, 109, 227, 228, 230, 231, 
233, 234, 248, 250 and 275.) 



3 § 


displaced in several places, one of which was about 
a hundred feet from the location assigned to the mine. 
The comparatively uninjured part of the vessel for¬ 
ward of frame 18 was hauled aft 72 feet, partially 
telescoping the shell left by the explosion, thrown 
upon its beam ends, and left with stem in the mud 
where frame 22 should be found. The keel was not 
only bent but for more than 20 feet practically folded 
back upon itself exactly as might have been expected 
as the indirect results of an internal explosion. 34 Be¬ 
tween the displaced prow and in the uninjured after 
part of the ship the divers walked about unimpeded, 
while no beams or wreckage above their heads ob¬ 
structed the free movements of life-lines or other por¬ 
tions of the diving apparatus. Three of the divers re¬ 
port a hole in the mud about frame 22 where the 
stem now lies, 35 but they differ greatly as to its depth- 


34 . See Exhibit L. 

35. I.—Powelson. “Gunner Morgan reported that in walking on 

the bottom he fell into a hole on the port side and went down 
into the mud. He also reported that, as far as he could judge, 
everything seemed to be bent upward in the vicinity of this hole.” 
(P. 45.) II.—Gunner Morgan. Q. It has been stated in this court 
by another witness that you fell into a hole. How about that? 
A. There is a place there where it is deeper than any other place. 
That is where the soft mud is. Q. You could find no bottom to 
that hole at all? A. Yes, there is bottom there. Q. How far did 
you get in? A. About half waist. Near the arm-pits. Q. What 
was the nature of the hole. Did you find the boundaries of the 
hole at all? A. No; it is an open space, very soft, slushy mud. 

Q. But you did not touch the edges of this hole? A. It is simply 

an incline, but nothing to make a round hole. Q. You do not 

know how big the hole was then? A. No, sir. Q. You do not 

know how the metal was bent at the hole? A. There was no 
metal at the hole. (P. 67.) III.—Ensign Powelson. (Explaining 
work of Gunner’s Mate Smith): “At the point where the flat 
keel goes into the mud he found a hole in the mud. He made 
out that the bottom of this hole was about six inches deep.” Q. 



39 


and width, nor would either description answer for a 
mine crater. Besides, such a hole—one whose depth 
equaled its width—would be a mechanical impossibility 
in mud so soft that divers sank in it to their waists. 
Dwyer, a very intelligent diver, searched for this hole 
but found only a place scooped out by the ram-plate, 
and the mud heaped up on one side only. 36 The note 
on Powelson's sketch—“hole 7 feet deep and 15 feet 
in diameter” 37 —is not warranted by the testimony of 
either of the divers, yet it was evidently this note that 
misled Dr. Bell (Nat. Mag. Aug. ’98) and M. H. 


Six inches, you say? A. No, sir; he found he hole to be about 
six feet deep and about fifteen feet in diameter. (P. 211.) IV.— 
Gunner's Mate Olsen. Q. Did you see anything of a deep impres¬ 
sion in the mud forward there? A. Yes, sir; right at the bow of 
the ship. Q. Under the bow, do you mean? A. Right where the 
keel goes into the mud I found a big hole in the mud. I could 
go right down into the hole and extend my arms and feel the 
top of the hole. It was about level with my armpits. Q. How 
deep was it? A. About four or five feet. Q. Was it solid at the 
bottom? A. It was muddy. It was seemingly more solid than 
any other mud higher up. Q. How wide was this at the top? A. 
It extended out from the ship four or five feet, then it seems 
to extend round the keel-shaft and round the keel. (P. 267.) V.— 
Gunner’s Mate Smith. Q. Do you remember finding a hole in the 
mud? A. Yes, but in a different place. It is by the bow where 
I found the hole. Q. How deep was this hole, do you think? A. I 
should judge seven feet. Q. How wide was it—the diameter, I 
mean? A. About the same, sir. Q. Was the bottom of the hole 
hard at this place? A. The mud was a little harder than the 
other mud. You would not sink over 18 inches in that mud. (P. 
241.) Q. Referring to the hole that you testified to on a previous 

occasion. . . . How deep do you think it was? A. I should 

judge it to be about seven feet deep. Q. How wide across the 

top? A. About the same, sir (P. 268.) 

36. Wm. H. Dwyer, Submarine Diver. "In regard to the depres¬ 
sion in the mud which you spoke of, I searched for that, and 
find no hollow such as was described. What I found was that 
the ram, when the bow fell over on the side, had turned up 
quite an amount of mud, and on going from top of that aft I 
appeared to go down in a hollow; but going from aft forward 

you find the general bottom, and then the mound raised by the 
ram." (P. 276.) 

37—Exhibit L, Maine Report. 



40 


Wilson (Nat. Review, July ’98). The center of the 
hole is fully 8 feet from the location assigned to the 
mine, hence the “tell-tale crater” seems to be a shadowy 
myth. 

From what has been said above it would appear that 
all the facts set forth in the report, and all the other 
far more startling and significant facts established by 
the evidence before the court, but strangely ignored 
in the findings, can be fully explained upon the theory 
of the explosion of the ship’s magazine alone. 

Before considering the mine theory it may not be 
out of place to state that a mine of high explosives 
always produces two very distinct and very unlike 
effects. First, there is the shock or vibration, and 
“Thor’s hammer could not deliver a more annihilating 
blow, and it is this first effect that shakes the earth 
and shatters ships.” But this shock does not crush, 
the amplitude of the vibrations being very small—it 
damages a vessel as an ordinary heavy explosion 
breaks windows. Secondly, a volume of water is 
driven bodily with great violence in the line of least 
resistance, and this may crush in and carry away the 
parts broken by the shock or not strong enough to 
resist this hydraulic avalanche. It is well-known that 
water plays the part of a solid when acted upon by an 
instantaneous force, hence a mine ordinarily cuts an 
inverted cone from the water as it would from a mass 
of ice or stone. The diameter of this cone determines 
the area of greatest efficiency and for this reason large 
mines are placed at considerable depth. 


41 


One objection to the mine theory suggests itself 
to the most casual reader of the report. The court 
finds that a section of the bottom plating 15 by 32 feet 
was bent upward and, a part of it at least, forced to a 
point 34 feet above, and that this was the work of the 
mine. But to reach this point the plating must pass 
through several decks that are not yet blown away— 
they were found to have been blown away by the 
second explosion. Again, our inspection of the hold 
plan of the vessel has revealed the fact that this dis¬ 
placed section was directly beneath the ship’s maga¬ 
zines that were found to have exploded. 38 This fact 
should be constantly kept in mind; it is important— 
very important—though not mentioned in the report. 
When this portion of the bottom was forced upward 
by the mine, as found by the court, it necessarily car¬ 
ried these magazines with it, and a large part of the 
explosives were above the decks said to have been 
blown upward by their explosion. If we assume that 
the two explosions were practically simultaneous, we 
not only discredit one of the findings of the court, 39 
but we make the effects attributed to the first explo¬ 
sion impossible, as the downward action of an ex¬ 
plosion of sufficient violence to destroy ponderous steel 
decks 70 feet away, would far more than counteract 
the upward force of the largest mine that would have 
been employed for such a purpose. 


38 —gee "Hold Plan"—Affairs In Cuba and "Exhibit L”—Maine 
Report. 

39. "Two explosions with a distinct Interval between." (P. 280.) 



42 


Our chief expert witness, Capt. Converse, gave it 
as his opinion that only a very large mine of low ex¬ 
plosives, situated at some distance below the bottom 
of the vessel could bend the bottom plating and keel 
as shown in Ensign Powelson’s sketch. 40 Now large 
mines are found to be most effective at a depth of 
about 60 feet, as shown by experiments upon the Ob ev¬ 
en, hence 8 or io feet, the greatest distance possible 
in this case, would certainly be considered quite close. 
But let it be granted that by “some distance” the ex¬ 
pert meant 8 or io feet. A mine io feet below frame 
18 would be 53 feet from frame 31 where the bottom 
is entirely missing, and 53 feet of “water-tamping” 
would have to be set in motion to crush in frames and 
reverse angle irons and carry the bottom entirely away 
from its natural position; while only 10 feet of such 
tamping would have to be set in motion directly above 
the mine to liberate the expanding gases. In such 
case a large part of the explosive force would act 
directly upward, and the plating at frame 18, instead 
of being simply forced upward, would have been shat¬ 
tered to fragments and scattered far and wide over the 
harbor. 

Again, the gases from a mine “somewhat to the 
port side” that should produce such effects at a hori- 


40. Commander Converse. Q. To what kind of an explosion do 
you attribute the force that caused this bending of plates and keel 
on sketch? A. I am of the opinion that it could be produced 
by the explosion of a submarine mine containing a large amount 
of the lower explosives—gunpowder or similar—not in contact with 
the ship, but some distance below it. (P. 259. See also P. 272.) 



43 


zontal distance of 52 feet—twice the greatest distance 
at which a mine was ever known to break through the 
shell of a ship—and would partly escape at the side 
of the ship, and a large volume of water would be 
thrown up; but there was no such upheaval of water. 
As Capt. Converse rejected the theory of a gun-cotton 
mine as inadequate to explain the phenomena pre¬ 
sented, 41 as he would not say that a mine so situated 
as to inflict the injuries received by the Maine's bottom 
could be expected to explode her magazines, 42 as he 
declined to say that a certain established fact was in¬ 
consistent with the theory of an internal explosion, 43 
one is led to suspect that he had little faith in the 
theory finally accepted by the court. 

Again, if a mine destroyed the Maine it was an 
observation mine—a contact mine being out of the 
question. 44 If an observation mine was employed, a 
cable connected it with the firing station, and one can 
hardly conceive how the court could have failed to 


41. See P. 259. 

42. Commander Converse. Q. Could such a mine, if producing 
that effect, also set fire to the ship’s magazines? A. I am unable 
to answer that question. (P. 260.) 

43. Commander Converse. Q. Do you think that ... it would 
have been possible for any man to have escaped alive? A. I think 
it not impossible. (P. 274.) 

44. Capt. Sigsbee. Q. If that mine had been placed there how 
would it have been exploded? A. I infer they never would have 
put a contact mine there that would haye, been exploded by contact 
with the bottom of the vessel, because other vessels were coming 
and going all the time, but an electric mine, having wires leading 
ashore or elsewhere. (Affairs in Cuba, P. 484.) II.—“Such mines, 
when sunk in harbors, are almost invariably discharged by means 
of electric currents conducted over a wire leading from the engine 
of destruction to some place on the shore where a battery can 
be housed, guarded, and attended by trained operators. (Affairs 
in Cuba, P. 6.) 



44 


cause a search to be made for this cable had there been 
either implicit confidence in the mine theory or a 
sincere desire to secure all available facts pertaining 
to the case. To have picked up the cable would have 
been a very simple matter, and its discovery would 
have afforded conclusive evidence of a mine; and if 
more convincing proof had been desired, it could have 
been obtained by following the cable to the wrought 
iron anchor left imbedded in the mud—the vital ques¬ 
tion could thus have been authoritatively settled in 
a single day. Nor is this all. By following this 
cable shoreward the “firing casemate” itself would 
have been discovered, and in the person of the officer 
in charge on the 15th day of February would have been 
found the arch assassin of the nineteenth century. 
Why was no search made for this cable? Capt. R. B. 
Bradford, testifying as expert witness before the 
Senate investigating committee, says the cable could 
easily have been drawn in from the shore. 45 But the 
very obliging captain, like many other witnesses called 
in, seems a little over solicitous not to disappoint the 
committee. For example, when it is desirable to show 
that a mine adequate to inflict the injuries sustained 
could have been placed under the Maine, he testifies 
that this could have been done despite the utmost 
vigilance of the crew ; 46 but when proof is needed that 


45. Commander Bradford. Q. Why should not these cables lead¬ 
ing to the torpedoes have been destroyed after the explosion? A. 
It was a very simple matter to haul them in. (Affairs in Cuba, 
P. 478.) 



45 


the Spanish government, and not a private party, was 
responsible, he informs us that mines cannot be placed 
without attracting attention. 47 Again, when evidence 
is wanted that a mine, and not our ship’s magazines 
caused her destruction, he says that from what he has 
read of the testimony there seems not to have been any 
serious explosions of the magazines, and that a mine 
of 300 pounds or less would do all the damage that was 
done to the Maine, and that enough modern explosives 
to do “that damage’’ might be conveyed in a rubber 
bag—a mine was not a necessity. 48 But when the 
complicity of the Spanish government was to be estab¬ 
lished he was very sure that a mine of extraordinary 
size was employed—no ordinary mine “would be suffi¬ 
ciently powerful to produce the results produced in 
the Maine A 40 When the absence of dead fish is to 
be explained he states that as a result of submarine 


46. Commander Bradford. Do you think it possible for a mine 

to have been placed there with the discipline probable on board? 
A. Oh, yes; I think it was possible. Q. How? A. There are vari¬ 
ous ways. . . . (Affairs in Cuba, 473.) 

47. Commander Bradford. Q. In your study of this question, 
have you ever known of private individuals putting torpedoes in 
harbors to destroy ships? A. I never heard of it. Q. It costs a 
great deal of money? A. Yes, sir; and it cannot be carried on 
without attracting attention. (Affairs in Cuba P. 475.) 

48. Commander Bradford. Q. What would be the size and gen¬ 
eral character of that mine? A. It would be rather difficult to 
estimate the amount of explosive, but I would say that 300 pounds 
of modern explosive would do all the damage that was done to 
the Maine and very possibly a smaller amount. (Affairs in Cuba, 
P. 472.) Q. You also said that dynamite or modern explosives 
might be conveyed in a rubber bag? A. Yes, sir; and I want to 
enlarge on that point. It does not follow of necessity that that 
damage could not be done in any other way than by the use of a 
submarine mine. (Affairs in Cuba, P. 477.) 

49. Commander Bradford. Q. Would the ordinary torpedo be 
sufficiently powerful to produce the result produced in the Maine? 
A. In my opinion it would not. (Affairs in Cuba, P. 475.) 



46 


explosions “many fish apparently dead are only stun¬ 
ned, and after a time recover and disappear,” and that 
in this case “there was ample time for the fish to dis¬ 
appear before daylight.” 50 Had an ordinary cable 
been employed and laid in the usual way it could not 
have been hauled in from the shore (See Armstrong’s 
“Torpedoes and Torpedo Warfare,” Chap. VII, or any 
good encyclopedia). But conceding a special cable to 
have been employed, and this 1,500 or 2,000 feet of 
cable to have been miraculously preserved from set¬ 
tling into the thicker mud during the weeks or months 
it had been lying there, (the Maine had been lying in 
the harbor more than three weeks), still a single 
glance at “Exhibit K,” (Maine Report) will show that 
to have drawn it from under the debris would have 
been next to impossible. 

Capt. Bradford does not agree with Capt. Converse 
as to the character of the explosives employed, but ac¬ 
cepts the popular theory of a gun-cotton or similar 
mine, 61 but the absence of dead fish is strong circum¬ 
stantial evidence against this hypothesis. Our naval 
commission practically ignored this well-known effect 
of mine explosions, and it would have been more to 


50. Commander Bradford: “Many of the fish that appear to 
be dead after a submarine explosion are only stunned, and after a 
time recover and disappear. The explosion of the Maine occurred 
at 9:40 p. m. I consider that there was ample time for the fish 
to have disappeared before daylight.” (Affairs in Cuba, P. 4 81, 
note.) 

51. Commander Bradford. Q. In your opinion, what kind of a 
mine must that have been to have the effect shown there? A. 
It must have been a mine of what is termed "high explosives,” 
I think. (Affairs in Cuba p. 472.) 



47 


the credit of our witnesses if the Senate committee 
had shown like discretion. Capt. Sigsbee’s suggestion 
that the fish may leave the harbor at night, 52 and his 
other hypothesis that the Reconcentradoes ate them, 53 
awaken our pity for a faithful officer whose mental 
strain has driven him to catch at such straws. The 
theory of another witness that the fish floated out to 
sea during the night, is abusrd in view of the fact 
that the water about the ship was covered with light 
wreckage that was not thus carried away. 54 The sug¬ 
gestion of expert Bradford that because some fish ap¬ 
parently killed revive in a few minutes, all fish brought 
up by a mine explosion will revive in time, if left 
alone, is worthy of Capt. Sigsbee. However, the 
statement of another expert, Admiral Irwin, 55 that 
ordinarily after a mine explosion no fish are seen on 
the water, taken in connection with his other state¬ 
ment that “at 30 feet depth a mine produces hardly 
any disturbance on the surface, even to a bubbling” 


62. Capt. Sigsbee: “Again, they say the fish leave the harbor 
and go to sea at night.” (Affairs in Cuba, P. 484.) 

63. Capt. Sigsbee: “The ship was blown up at 9:40 p. m., and 
even though there were dead fish, no one knows where they might 
have gone next morning. In the next place, I fancy if any dead 
fish were available, the reconcentrados would be glad to get them.” 
(Affairs in Cuba, P. 484.) 

64. See Affairs in Cuba, P. 500. Question by Senator Frye. 

65. Admiral Irwin: “The explosion of a mine at a depth of 

30 feet would hardly make an ebullition, even when there is 
nothing on the surface. . . . When I got below 4, or 5, or 6 
feet, the smaller the water column thrown up, and at 30, or 35, 
or 40 feet, hardly a disturbance on the surface, even to a bub¬ 
bling.” (Affairs in Cuba, P. 603.) “During my work in Mobile 
Bay, and it is fine fish producing water, in three or four weeks’ 
work I never saw one dead fish. . . . The Mare Island Straits 

abounds in fish, and I have had occasion to fire a great many 
torpedoes in those waters, and I never saw a dead fish in those 
waters while I was there.” (ibid. p. 499.) 



48 


varies the monotony somewhat and awakens a different 
feeling. Capt. Sigsbee’s statement that an explosion 
inside the vessel would have killed fish the same as an 
external explosion , 56 was not well considered, as the 
magazines in question contained no high explosives . 57 
Had the presence of fish in Havana Harbor, or the 
fatal effects of a mine explosion upon fish, really been 
doubted, such doubts could readily have been con¬ 
firmed or dissipated by an experimental explosion. 

Another objection is this: A mine of high explosives 
placed near enough to the bottom of the vessel for all 
the gas to escape through her hold, “would have cut 
a well defined hole blowing that part that was cut out 
into very small fragments” 58 —such a hole as was dis¬ 
covered and photographed by a New York “yellow 
journal” immediately after the catastrophe. Ensign 
Powelson says 59 “The mine could not have been very 


56. Capt. Sigsbee. Q. Why would not that (an internal explo¬ 
sion) have killed the fish? A. I think it would. (Affairs in 
Cuba, P. 484.) 

57. Gunner Hill. Q. Was there anything stowed in the maga¬ 
zines and shell rooms in the way of high explosives? A. No, sir. 
(P. 145.) 

58. Commander Converse: “Were the mine in contact with the 
ship, or quite close to it, I think the effect upon the bottom of 
the ship would be—depending, of course, upon the size of the 
mine—to blow to pieces that part of the ship directly over the 
center of the explosion. In other words, that the violent explosive 
would cut a hole, blowing that part that was cut out into small 
fragments.” (P. 259.) 

59. Ensign Powelson: “On the bottom forward, where the frame 
was thrown up, it would seem to me that the force was com¬ 
municated some distance through the water, because this thing 
was lifted up instead of being battered in. It was a force that 
was cushioned in some way, because the diver tells me there was 
a bulge in plates between the two frames. ... It struck me, 
as I was looking at it, that the mine there could not have been 
very close to those plates that were lifted up, because, as I say, 
the plates are not so much damaged as bent in the form of a 
V and raised up a vertical distance.’’ (P. 112.) 




49 


close to the plates that were lifted because the plates 
are not so much damaged as bent in the form of a V 
and raised up a vertical distance.” Again, a mine so 
situated as to find vent through the vessel at frame 18, 
would have damaged the bottom at frame 31, 52 feet 
distant, by shock only, and would not have forced it 
upward. Furthermore, the hot gases escaping into the 
vessel would have destroyed or discolored the paint 
on the bottom plating, at least about the fissures; but 
no such discoloration occurred. The explosion of the 
magazines burnt all the felting off the forward part 
of a boiler several yards from the nearest explosives 60 
—surely a mine near the bottom plates would have 
injured their coating of paint. No wonder that Capt. 
Converse rejected-the theory of a mine in close prox¬ 
imity to the vessel's bottom. 

The objections to the theory of a remote mine are 
not less serious. The bottom of the vessel was crushed 
in from frame 15 to frame 41 61 —more than 100 feet— 
hence the mine would have to be deep enough to 
give the inverted cone marking its effective field, a 
base 100 feet in diameter—a condition of things utterly 
impossible with a space of not more than 12 feet be¬ 
tween the vessel and the bottom of the harbor. Then, 
too, with such a destructive area, or even a destruc- 


60. Wm. H. Dwyer: “The felting was all burned off the forward 

part of boiler B.” (P. 263.) 

61. Ensign Powelson: “The ship yielded at 17 and also at 

15. Frame 15 was blown In.” (P. 109.) “I concluded that the 
break in the ship’s side was at the same frame as the frame on 
the port side—about frame 41.” (P. 214.) 



50 


tive zone of 64 feet diameter, as implied in the decision 
of the court, the mine could not find vent through the 
vessel and an upheaval of water must necessarily re¬ 
sult; but there was no such upheaval. 

The bending of the keel involves the shortening of 
the ship, and from Ensign Powelson’s sketch (Exhibit 
A) the actual shortening was fully 72 feet. 62 This 
shortening involves the hauling of the forward part 
of the ship a long distance aft. If we assume that not 
more than two thirds of the forward part of the ship 
was blown overboard, there would still remain a thou¬ 
sand tons to be thus removed. Bearing in mind that 
the direct destructive action of a mine is practically in¬ 
stantaneous, lasting but a small fraction of a second, 
it follows that the mine theory involves the practically 
instantaneous shortening of the vessel. An upward 
stroke that would shorten the ship by 72 feet, even 
after 2,000 tons of material had been blown overboard, 
would necessitate the intantaneous movement of for¬ 
ward and after portions through distances inversely 
proportional to their weights, and aggregating 72 feet, 
and this would require a keel of supernatural tensile 
strength. But the evidence shows that there was no 
such movement of the after part at least, nor was the 
keel from Vulcan’s forge. But this hypothetical stroke 
was given before the superstructure was injured by 
the explosion of the magazines, hence the bending 


62. See Exhibit L. 



5 1 


of the keel and the consequent shortening of the ship 
under such circumstances involves still other miracles. 
In brief the report is self-contradictory in attributing 
to a first explosion eflfects that must follow those at¬ 
tributed to a second, and the effects assigned to the 
former involve paradoxes that no hypothesis can har¬ 
monize. With slight changes in phraseology, the im¬ 
portant findings of the court might be stated thus: “In 
the opinion of the court, a mine under the bottom of the 
ship at about frame 18 exploded, and by this ex¬ 
plosion a section of the outer plating of the ship’s 
bottom 15 feet broad and 32 feet in length (from 
frame 17 to frame 25), and carrying many tons of 
powder was doubled back upon itself against a con¬ 
tinuance of the same extending forward,” and forced 
upward through the superincumbent decks, part of it 
to a point 34 feet above its normal position. The 
court also finds that this explosion broke the vertical 
keel at frame 18 and' forced it upward through four 
decks supported by many tons of massive steel deck- 
beams to a point 30 feet above its proper place and at 
the same time shortened the ship about 72 feet. The 
court further finds that after a “short but distinct in¬ 
terval of time” a part of this upheaved powder ex¬ 
ploded carrying away the decks through which it had 
just passed, blowing “that portion of the port side 
of the protective deck which extends from frame 30 
to frame 41, up, aft, and over to port; and the main 
deck from about frame 30 to frame 41, up, aft, and 


52 


slightly over to starboard, folding the forward middle 
part of the superstructure over and on top of the 
after port.” 

Thus paraphrased, the report gains in clearness by 
narrating the events in their proper order, by correctly 
locating the exploding magazines as well as the ex¬ 
ploding mine, and by expressly stating some things 
that are necessarily assumed in the report, but not al¬ 
ways supplied by the casual reader. But it must be 
admitted that while the report thus gains in perspecuitv 
it loses somewhat in its most vulnerable point—its cred¬ 
ibility—and in the suggested form might not have fully 
satisfied the yellow journals and their readers, nor, 
indeed, have stirred to action a President who seemed 
loth to involve the country in war. 


03.—I. 37. The condition of the vertical keel and flat keel at frame 
18 was ascribed by the court of inquiry of 1898 to the direct effect 
of an explosion exterior to the ship in that vicinity. Because of its 
better opportunity for a detailed examination of this wreckage, 
now fully exposed, the board concludes that the external ex¬ 
plosion was not in the vicinity of frame 18. The board believes 
that the condition of the wreckage, other than that of B and C 
strakes from 27^4 to 33 described hereafter, can be accounted for 
by the action of gases of low explosives such as the black and 
brown powders with which the forward magazines were stored. 
The protective deck and hull of the ship formed a closed chamber, 
in which the gases were generated and partially expanded before 
rupture.—(Second Report, Congressional Record, Dec. 14, 1911.) 

The condition of B and C strakes from 27 to 31 is not alluded 
to in first report. Since the second report finds all else to be the 
result of an interior explosion it leaves the first mine theory with¬ 
out a vestige of support so far as the condition of the wreck is con- 
concerned. 

38. The port garboard strake between 27 y 2 and 31 was dished 
upward along its outboard edge as much as 24 inches from a 
straight line between 27}4 and 31 (see Exhibit D 3), the dish dis¬ 
appearing about 31. At a buttstrap in this garboard strake mid¬ 
way between frames 30 and 31 the after plate and strap were 
found pulled away from the forward plate and upward fully 6 
inches farther than the after end of the forward plate, having been 



53 


torn loose from the flat keel plate by parting the rivets on the 
seam between 30J4 and 31. 

39. B strake was reenforced for its entire length by a con¬ 
tinuous longitudinal. This B plate parted the rivets along its 
inboard seam from 30 1 / 2 forward to 27 y 2 across the buttstrap at 
27 y 2 and aft along its outboard seam to 28. 

40. The next plate outboard, C strake, was torn irregularly 
from 28 inboard to 29 outboard, and parted the rivets along the 
outboard seam as far aft as frame 33, remaining attached to B 
strake along its inboard seam from frame 28 aft. This plating, 
formed of B and C plates as just described, an area of approxi¬ 
mately 100 square feet, was displaced upward, inward, and to star¬ 
board through approximately 180 degrees, having swung about an 
axis from about 30 ]/ 2 inboard and forward to about 31 1 / 2 outboard 
and aft. (See Exhibits D 2, D 3, D 5, D 7.) 

41. The transverse floor plates between the outer skin plating, 
above described, and the inner bottom plating were crumpled. 
The part of the inner bottom plating directly over this section of 
outside plating was displaced inward and aft, and crumbled in 
numerous folds. (See Exhibit D 4, folds marked “X.”) 

42. The longitudinal directly over the center of B plate parted 
its fastenings, broke about frame 28, was twisted, the forward 
end was displaced upward and left approximately 6 feet above its 
original position. (See Exhibit D 1, longitudinal marked “X.”) 

43. The hoard finds that the injuries to the bottom of the 
Maine, above described, were caused by the explosion of a charge 
of a low form of explosive exterior to the ship between frames 
28 and 31, strake B, port side. This resulted in igniting and ex¬ 
ploding the contents of a 6-inch reserve magazine, A—14—M, said 
contents including a large quantity of black powder. The more 
or less complete explosion of the contents of the remaining for¬ 
ward magazine followed. The magazine explosions resulted in 
the destruction of the vessel.— (Second Report, Congressional Record, 
Dec. 14, 1911.) 

“Strake^” are fore and aft strips of plating—here about four feet 
wide. They are lettered from the keel, A (garboard), B, C, etc. 
The frames are four feet apart. With these facts in mind one can 
readily make a sketch showing the fractures described above. 

To account for the break in B strake longitudinal at 28 the 
mine should be at or near this frame, but this would make the 
fracture at 33, outboard C strake, more than 20 feet from the 
mine and necessitate a destructive zone more than 40 feet in diam¬ 
eter—practically an impossibility under the conditions known to 
have existed. If we assume the mine to have been at 31 we place 
it 12 feet from the break in the longitudinal and in a region little 
injured. If we choose an intermediate position the mine will be 
too far away from both 28 and 33 and in an area in which the 
damage is not relatively great. If, however, we assume an inter¬ 
nal explosion and bear in mind that the 100 square feet of B and 
C plating was acted upon by an upward pressure of sixty odd 
tons, and that this upward pressure was reinforced by the enor¬ 
mous upward strain on B strake longitudinal till it parted at 28, 
we fully explain all the conditions found to exist In the region 
under examination. 



















* 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































t 




























































































































































































































































































































































